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INTELLECTUAL HUMILITY IN PUBLIC DISCUSSION  
 
Abstract. In this article the authors analyze intellectual humility as a cognitive and a 
communicative virtue. Public discussions on controversial topics – religious and scientific 
debates included – are becoming an increasingly important part of social life. They are viewed as 
important for the future of democratic societies as political procedures traditionally associated 
with democracy. In order to make a public dialogue more beneficial for the society it is essential 
to understand what obstacles may arise in its way and what the possible strategies to overcome 
them are. One of such behavioral strategies is intellectual humility. Humility has a long history 
of being recognized as a virtue. The authors analyze its potential for contemporary societies, 
undertake etymological analysis and compare intellectual humility to other associated 
intellectual virtues and vices such as open-mindedness and intellectual hubris. The core point of 
this article is that prejudiced cognition is bound to become limited or outright false, whereas 
intellectually humble research and dialogue efforts lead to true understanding – both cognitive 
and interpersonal.  Intellectual humility is perceived as an especially valuable asset for any 
researcher, administrator or public speaker. 
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Modern public communications as a network of various open institutions and social 
practices are actively shaping mass consciousness and its numerous manifestations. Although 
contemporary mind is often characterized as mostly secular, we can see a lot of successful 
attempts to influence it via social and information channels from major religious confessions. 
One cannot blame their activists for irrationalizing the discourse: appealing to faith, emotions 
and intuitive insights of their target group. On the contrary, their arguments are often quite 
rational – if we understand rationality as a human intellectual ability to find non-contradictive 
reasons for certain ideas and representations. 
 
Modern studies on religion in democratic societies underline the increasing influence of 
public discussions which are becoming nearly as important as other democratic procedures. They 
are more than just ways to define winners and losers in a competition for power: they are a 
mechanism to form public opinion on socially important questions or even to produce a decent 
consensus. Public discussions are an essential tool of this process, it would be impossible to 
make democracy stable unless this mechanism functioned well. Moreover, these discussions turn 
out as important as democratic procedures and their outcomes. To be more exact, they allow 
groups of people to control state power and make it more accountable. 
 
However, even in modern public discussions their participants when faced with hard 
questions are often trying to ignore them, reject or marginalize their opponents’ views. This 
problem remains acute both in political debate (when combating sides are trying to highlight 
intellectual flaws of each other) and in unsuccessful attempts to establish a religious dialogue 
(when orthodox dogmas and confessional arrogance become an impediment to mutual 
understanding). D. Uzlaner – a well-known Russian specialist in religious studies – formulates a 
number of arguments aimed to prove the social importance of a dialogue between science and 
religion. He underlines its significance for stability of modern constitutional democratic societies 
including Russia (Uzlaner, 2015). But even scholars who claim to be objective often manifest a 
strong and uncompromised need to protect the ideas they perceive as “their”. Sometimes it 
makes them ignore significant arguments against their positions and have no empathy for their 
opponents’ views. 
 Axiological problems of value development become epistemological tasks of intellectual 
communications management. A part of political elite and a part of society have already 
recognized that state power cannot be the only source of information and its interpretation. 
Dialogue-oriented information culture is developing rapidly and inevitably. It is going to replace 
the monologue-oriented form of information space organization. With Internet development, a 
great number of people can now practically “make themselves heard” – but in order to avoid the 
cacophony of their voices we need certain conditions to organize a functional dialogue instead of 
a superficial one.  
 
To find a successful solution for effective interaction in public sphere one can use forms 
and methods developed by religion itself. They could lead to a more harmonious integration of 
rational intersubjectivity of public discourse and subjectivity of religious beliefs. Intellectual 
humility is one of such forms of attitude to knowledge. It has historically developed within 
Christian culture and can prove beneficial for contemporary public dialogue between religious 
and secular organizations. In our opinion, intellectual humility is psychologically relevant in 
such a dialogue compared to a blind conviction in one’s own exclusive knowledge of the truth – 
intellectual hubris. 
 
Intellectual humility is acceptance that we do not and cannot know absolutely everything, 
and that what we do know – we should not use selfishly. Instead, we should admit that we can 
err in our blind belief of how much we understand and seek wisdom we lack nowadays. 
  
The problem of humble acceptance and bold denial has great significance in Christianity 
inheriting Old Testament traditions. It takes ontological perspective in this context, hence it is 
exactly from this point that the fall of man follows when Adam and Eve deny God’s will. All 
Biblical history, deeds of saints and prophets can be perceived as a choice between accepting 
God’s will, people and sins or struggling against them. It’s a common place in Bible to describe 
a human being as spiritually and physically weak and not self-sufficient: he is taken hostage by 
diseases, old age and death, he makes mistakes, feels fear, falls into illusions, he sins. As a result, 
he does not have absolute freedom and independence. Whether he wants it or not, he is doomed 
to obey: “Do you not know that if you present yourselves to anyone as obedient slaves, you are 
slaves of the one whom you obey, either of sin, which leads to death, or of obedience, which 
leads to righteousness?” (Romans 6:16, English Standard Version). At the same time, people 
have a freedom of will and, on the one hand, can resist God, His laws and commandments, on 
the other hand, people can resist other people, passions, sins and even Satan. 
 
It is noteworthy that Biblical texts as well as ancient philosophers’ texts contain a lot of 
synonyms denoting submission and struggle against it. To describe submissive human behavior 
these texts use such words as “slavery”, “obedience”, “modesty”, “humility”, “service”, 
“docility”. Despite the fact that the antagonism between humility and hubris (as a ground for 
rebellion against God), antagonism between slavery and freedom has deep roots and influences 
the development of Christian and world ethics, thought, culture and science, there are still no 
consensus on the unified terms to describe this problem. Various terms used by scholars for its 
descriptions are often synonyms – with rare exceptions they denote the same meanings. 
 
European philosophy (as once antic philosophy was) is still interested in studying 
humility in all spheres of life: spiritual, moral, public, scientific, artistic, etc. Irrespective of 
schools and directions, many philosophers find it obvious that there is always something people 
have to submit to, something they have to accept in order to harmonize their private and their 
public life. In this sense, humility draws borders of private and public life. Descartes, for 
instance, offers “precise and simple rules which – if followed strictly – will prevent taking the 
false for the true and help the mind without excessive effort truly understand everything it can 
reach” (Descartes, 1993). At first glance, Descartes does not explicitly say anything about 
humility, but in fact, his method implies that its user consciously chooses to obey “precise and 
simple rules” which is a part of definition of humility that we use. It is also worth mentioning 
that speaking of consciously abandoning moral and intellectual freedom Descartes introduces a 
term “vicious humility” (Descartes, 1993) which describes human weakness, inability of people 
to be self-sufficient and as a consequence of their conscious submission to other people. 
 
Taking into account that terms denoting the idea connected to conscious submission of a 
person to circumstances, other people's will or a certain system of values are synonims, we can 
use the word "smirenie" (humility). Its etymology shows how a person consciously compares 
themselves with a "mera" (measure) from Old Slavonic "smeriti" (to measure) - "umerit'" (to 
restrict), "umyagchit'" (to mitigate), "podavit'" (to submit). At the same time being close to the 
word "mir" (world, peace) in folk etymology, the word "smirenie" (humility) reflects all the 
outer world reality in its variety: natural world with its laws, human world with its norms and 
values (Fasmer, 1986). It is also worth noting that the word "mir" in the Russian language has 
another meaning apart from "world": it can also mean "consent, peaceful state, absence of 
enmity, conflict, war", which allows us to accentuate the freedom to choose humility compared 
to submission that can only be mechanical and constrained. 
 
This network of meanings of the word “smirenie” (humility) is a serious argument in 
favor of using it as a term. This term expresses a notion that contains a wide variety of human 
behaviors that can be described as “conscious obedience”. We can compare this term to the term 
“skromnost’” (modesty) which has a much narrower meaning. The number of meaning covered 
by the term “smirenie” (humility) is also directly linked to its etymology: to what and how a 
person brings themselves to a “mera” (measure), to which circumstances and values they submit 
only depends on the person. 
 
Humility as a virtue is aimed against such vices as arrogance, vanity, conceit, egoism, 
snobbism and smugness which are summarized in Christian notion of hubris – a sin understood 
as “misplaced pride”. Intellectual humility manifests itself in awareness that you can always be 
prone to intellectual mistakes. This makes a thinker more open-minded and able to review their 
position, less inclined to be blindly sure of their knowledge and more respectful to other people’s 
views. It also allows people not to be afraid of intellectual controversies.   
 
There is no stable conceptual understanding of humility yet. For instance, mass beliefs 
studies on intellectual humility reveal such components as open-mindedness, absence of fear to 
admit and correct a mistake and to listen to all parties involved (Spiegel, 2012). These epistemic 
virtues heavy with axiological implications do not only concern intellectual debates, but also 
have high theoretical importance in various philosophical (Christen, Robinson & Alfano, 2014), 
psychological (Samuelson et al., 2015) and even psychotherapeutic projects (Schwab, 2012).  
 
The history of philosophy hardly helps to find the undoubtedly true definition of what 
humility is. David Hume described humility as a feeling of shame whereas Thomas Aquinas 
viewed it as a restriction to exorbitant vanity. Modern authors sometimes associate humility with 
low self-esteem. However, other authors note that in fact it indicates not a lower self-esteem, but 
a more precise one. It is important to highlight that intellectual humility is linked to a lack of 
obsession with one’s social status demonstrated by the legendary teachers of humanity – Jesus 
and Socrates. For Jesus humility does not mean taking care of his divine status, it means taking 
care of something much greater than himself impersonating absolute love of the creator towards 
sinful humanity. Socratic humility manifested itself in ignoring social evaluation and being 
passionate about preserving the truth and his one virtue in the face of eternity. 
Modern philosophers define intellectual humility as a propensity to owning one’s 
intellectual restrictions. The most distinctive feature is the necessity to be attentive to one’s style 
of thinking and the ability to manage one’s intellectual potential as well as a feeling of dignity 
(Whitcomb, Battaly, Baehr & Howard‐Snyder, 2015). In our opinion, humility is not simply 
opposed to hubris. It is a virtue being in a median position between the extremes of arrogance on 
the one hand and servility on the other hand.  
  
An intellectually humble person does not over-estimate their beliefs, but at the same time 
does not under-estimate them. Instead, they believe their views to be appropriate to their 
epistemic status and intellectual capacity. Intellectually humble people do not repress or cover 
their vulnerability, they see their weaknesses as sources of personal development and use 
arguments as opportunities to develop and specify their ideas. 
  
Naturally, humble people are more open-minded, they can quicker resolve their 
controversies because they admit that their opinion is not the final word on the subject. 
Intellectual humility is based on the ability to prefer the truth to the social status. Humble people 
see personal growth as a value in itself – not as a means of climbing higher up the social ladder. 
The Internet and social media have created an impression of boundless and easily accessible 
knowledge. It creates an illusion that we have wisdom, but we miss a lot of information if we are 
self-centered and only care about our place in this world. Each time we think there is a threat to 
our social and epistemic status we invest great effort into defending our existing views. This 
creates a risk of losing a new channel of knowledge and a curious unselfish truth-seeker in 
ourselves. 
 
An intellectually humble person will admit that knowledge depends on the contributions 
of other people expressing gratitude and acknowledgement. This in its turn, will promote a 
collective quest for truth. Thus, intellectual humility is both individual and interpersonal 
disposition towards unprejudiced and open-minded treatment of others. 
 
By contrast, overconfidence manifests itself in intellectual hubris and will devaluate 
others’ views and beliefs which may spur conflicts and misunderstanding. Intellectual hubris 
makes people vane and unduly self-confident. This eventually leads to the narrow-mindedness of 
their views. Such intellectual disposition will also lead to denial of cognitive contributions of 
other people and undermine collective efforts to obtain true knowledge. A person can be 
considered intellectually arrogant if they do not want to or cannot change their beliefs even in the 
face of obvious counter-arguments. 
  
Understanding intellectual humility as an axiologically meaningful epistemic virtue can 
be an alternative to intellectual hubris in many controversial questions in public discussions. 
Humility does not lead a person to withdrew into themselves and to feel uncertain because it is 
closely connected to such cognitive qualities as open-midedness, curiosity and honesty. 
Cultivating intellectual humility can lead to a more constructive participation of religious 
organizations in solving social and humanitarian problems, because it creates a level playing 
field for all actors lifting the burden of a claim for final truth monopoly. 
 
How much would we advance in mutual understanding if disputing parties were trying to 
admit their cognitive restraints for the sake of collectively discovering truth? Is it possible in a 
dialogue where participants realize opinions, strengths and contributions of other people being at 
the same time ready to admit their own strengths and weaknesses and being ready to be open-
minded and able to learn from others? It is quite possible that humility – both intellectual and 
emotional – will not only enrich our understanding of what makes life meaningful and useful, 
but will also lead to a better social life. 
 
While accepting humility as a value we do not claim we know the right answers to the 
questions above. Promoting humility as an intellectual norm has only recently become an object 
of systematic studies. Nevertheless, based on scant empiric research and certain tendencies in 
speculative arguments we can express several ideas. Firstly, humility has a positive correlation 
with a number of virtues such as mercy, honesty, gratitude and cooperation. Secondly, humble 
people experience less negative psychological symptoms and report better health. This may be 
due to the fact that humility is linked to such health factors as the ability to forgive and gratitude. 
Thirdly, humility correlates with success in certain spheres of life – especially connected to 
management and cognition. Finally, humble people are simply perceived by others as kinder, 
more appealing people. 
 
If in science necessity is the mother of invention, humility is definitely its father. 
Scientists should be ready to abandon their theories in favor of newer, more precise explanations 
in order to keep up with constant innovations. Many scientists who had made important 
discoveries early in their career later became trapped by their ego and could not accept newer 
true findings. Intellectually humble scientists reap more benefits from knowledge and intuition 
than those who lack this virtue. Groundbreaking discoveries made in young age bring certain 
impediments along with the world recognition: they make a further pursuit for truth more 
difficult because one becomes restrained by their fame. It is only a humble love for truth that can 
remove these obstacles. It allows to search for true knowledge despite social evaluation. 
 
Scientific cognition necessarily requires a certain measure of humility. This humility 
manifests itself in self-discipline, brining ones activities to order, incessant scrupulous labor. 
Despite occasional sudden insights, it takes a long period of painstaking work to make them 
possible. According to P. Chaadaev, “…all powers of mind, all its means of cognition are only 
based on its obedience. The more it obeys, the stronger it is. And there is only one question for 
human mind: what to obey?” (Chaadaev, 1969) 
  
Humility in scientific cognition is not only necessary for a scientist to organize their work 
properly – it is also necessary to serve the search for truth which is the only goal of scientific 
cognition as it should be. A scientist should search for objective truth. They should not 
manipulate the results of their research in accordance with their wishes, dominant world picture, 
public opinion or state ideology. A search for truth presupposes humility: the very concept of 
unattainable absolute truth constantly reminds that even if some knowledge seems well-proved 
and consistent it is still not the absolute and final truth itself. Every knowledge should only be 
perceived as incomplete and hence open for criticism, revision and discussion. 
 
Intellectual humility manifesting itself in acceptance of our own cognitive restraints, 
professional discipline and search for truth is closely connected to scientific skepticism and a 
critical analysis of both recognized scientific theories and one’s own insights. There are no 
insurmountable obstacles between scientific and religious cognition because intellectual humility 
is characterized by prioritizing knowledge itself and pursuit for truth which allow us to stop 
caring of our social image and status and to weaken the feeling of self-importance for a while. 
According to Paul the Apostle: “Knowledge puffeth up, but love edifieth” (Corinthians 8:1, 
American Standard Version). Love for knowledge edifieth in humility. 
  
Knowledge comes through various channels that can be blocked by incessant care about 
one’s own social status. The one who keeps these channels open, succeeds in obtaining 
knowledge. This process requires that we be able to listen to and to hear others without putting 
too much effort into comparing our knowledge to newly acquired knowledge in order to express 
our superiority. This, in its turn, requires open-mindedness to admit that our personal opinions 
are to a certain extant fallacies. 
  
George Edward Moore demonstrated intellectual humility when during his lectures on the 
concepts of truth at Cambridge he sometimes critically mentioned what he had said before on the 
subject treating those statements as if they had been made by some other philosopher and require 
correction. He also sometimes announced that he was going to proceed to another step of his 
argumentation because he had not known how to do that in a logically consistent way before. 
G.E. Moore did not seem concerned with his professor status because he was deeply concerned 
with finding the truth. His love for knowledge overcame his care for status and this intellectual 
humility made him one of the most prominent philosophers of the 20-th century. 
 
Being intellectually humble does not mean being servile. It does not imply ignoring one’s 
social status completely, repenting one’s real or imaginary flaws and it does not imply a pressing 
need for a religious blessing either. 
 
It would be plausible to assume that differences in statements describing the nature and 
values of humility are often created by differences in moral and religious approaches. If it is true, 
it would take special conditions to define the contexts in which religious, moral and scientific 
conceptions of intellectual humility form. To define these contexts it is important to clarify how 
intellectual humility is connected to other intellectual virtues such as intellectual courage, 
objectivity, intellectual honesty, justice, mercy, independence, persistence and practical wisdom. 
All of these virtues are directly related to humility and can even be seen as one system of 
intellectually positive characteristics, but understanding of each of them depends on its relations 
to the rest of these virtues. 
 
An important question beyond the scope of this article is the practical problem of 
developing intellectual humility. How can we bring up intellectually humble or – in a broader 
sense – intellectually virtuous people? What disciplines should they learn to develop these 
qualities? Humanitarian and social educators show the importance of collective imagination and 
social design in order to prove that various identities (national, racial, religious, gender) are to a 
large degree constructs and even consequences of involuntary fallacies.  
 
In solving a practical problem of intellectual humility development the task of cultivating 
respect to the Other is the most important one. There are several behavioral and relation models 
manifesting this respect: open-mindedness, being ready to consider different points of view, an 
ability to involve the maximum number of interested parties in a decision-making process. We 
should not underestimate our obvious or yet undiscovered prejudices: we all have certain 
predispositions, their development can be depicted as concentric circles expanding from our 
families to the rest of humanity that lives and acts in different, unknown to us ways.  It is very 
important to monitor our own prejudices and see the limits of our perception, blind spots of our 
intellectual vision. 
 
For instance, it is quite possible to discover one’s unconscious associations that our brain 
has accumulated, using various association tests. Thus, everybody can learn of their hidden 
prejudices on such things as a race, religion, politics, education, nationality or sexual orientation. 
The aim of this is not to provoke guilt, but to become aware of the possible influence of these 
prejudices on our everyday life. 
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